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INTRODUCTION

“We needed a way to keep an eye on the American citizens without
them knowing. It was imperative, for their own safety of course.”
– President Richard Nixon (1978)
Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim
resided in Southern California.1 They spent their days working, spending
time with their families, and attending mosque.2 In 2006, although they
did not know it at the time, nor could they, their lives changed when their
daily activities began being surveilled by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (“FBI”) without their knowledge or consent.3 Under a
dragnet surveillance program titled “Operation Flex,” the FBI targeted and
surveilled hundreds of Muslims in the Orange County area to obtain as
much information as possible.4 Fazaga, Malik, AbdelRahim represent a
class of Muslims whose constitutional rights to freedom of religion and
privacy were invaded for no reason other than their Muslim religion.5
Unfortunately, in the wake of the tragic 9/11 attacks, their story and the
substantial invasion of their rights is all too common for Muslims across
America. The relationship between Muslim-Americans and law
enforcement has been one of tension for several years, as law
enforcement’s attempts to build trust with Muslim communities in order
to rely on community members to provide essential information on
terrorist activities are undermined by the invasion of substantial rights of
the very same Muslims they pretend to be in harmony with.6 These
methods of depriving Muslims of constitutionally protected rights have
1

First Amended Complaint at 21-25; Fazaga. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d
1202, 21-25 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. SA-CV-11-00301) [hereinafter First Amended
Complaint].
2
Id.
3
Id. at 15-18.
4
Id. at 1-2, 27.
5
Id. at 2.
6
See generally Bryan Tau, What is FISA? The Surveillance Law Behind the Memo
Explained, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2018); See Human Rights Institute,
Illusions of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, at 5 (July 2014).
[hereinafter Illusions of Justice] (discussing Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a US citizen, who was
swept up in a mass arrest campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003. Ali was whipped, denied food,
and threatened with amputation before he succumbed to his interrogators and gave a false
confession. At his trial in the United States, the judge ignored his claims of torture and
admitted his confession into evidence. He was convicted and is serving a life sentence in
solitary confinement in a supermax prison in Colorado).
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been numerous and far-reaching, ranging from the use of evidence
obtained by coercion7 to inhumane detention conditions.8 Since the attacks
of 9/11, the use of electronic surveillance in particular has been more
frequent, and nearly every branch of government has relaxed the
conditions of using electronic surveillance to spy on those suspected of
terrorism activities.9
This note uses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fazaga v. FBI to
illustrate how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) can be
used as a tool to the benefit of, rather than merely to the detriment of,
Muslims in America in order to protect their constitutional right to be free
of invasions of privacy on the basis of their religion. Part II of this note
discusses the history of the FISA, from the historically documented
executive abuse of suspicionless electronic surveillance, to the creation
and operation of FISA. Part III examines the history of the state secrets
privilege, often used as a cloak for the governments unconstitutional and
abusive investigation tactics under the guise of national security. Part IV
of this note summarizes the facts and shocking details of the case, Fazaga
v. FBI, paying particular attention to the egregious manner in which the
FBI’s undercover informant intruded on the privacy of Muslim
individuals. Part V provides an in-depth analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Fazaga v. FBI. Part V.A analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision
with regard to the substantive FISA claims, noting the court correctly
applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to Fazaga’s claims.
Finally, Part V.B argues the Ninth Circuit’s holding that FISA displaces
the state secrets privilege and thus plaintiff’s claims could proceed under
the procedures set forth in FISA without offending constitutional
principles of separation of powers.

7
See Illusions of Justice, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a US
citizen, who was swept up in a mass arrest campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003. Ali was
whipped, denied food, and threatened with amputation before he succumbed to his
interrogators and gave a false confession. At his trial in the United States, the judge ignored
his claims of torture and admitted his confession into evidence. He was convicted and is
serving a life sentence in solitary confinement in a supermax prison in Colorado).
8
Id. at 7 (discussing Uzair Paracha, who was held in solitary confinement for almost
two years before he was convicted on material support to terrorist activities charges. Nine
months after he was convicted, he spent another 9 months in solitary, unable to say
anything to anyone except the security guards, largely begging them to turn the lights off
or ask for basic necessities).
9
Id. at 59.
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THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

“Americans fought a revolution in part over the right to be free
from unreasonable searches – to ensure that our government
could not come knocking in the middle of the night for no reason.
We need to find a way forward to make sure we can stop terrorists
with protecting the privacy and liberty of innocent Americans.” –
Barack Obama (2006)

a.
Pre-FISA: The Judicial Response to Electronic
Surveillance
The Supreme Court first addressed the federal government’s use of
warrantless electronic surveillance in Olmstead v. United States,10 in
which it held electronic surveillance through wiretapping does not require
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment because such activity does not
amount to a search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment.11 However,
years later in Katz v. United States,12 the Supreme Court changed positions
and held that because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,”13 the wiretapping of a phone booth constitutes a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore subject to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.14 Since then, the Court has
implemented a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test pronounced in
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz to evaluate Fourth
Amendment violations.15 Katz, however, was a domestic case involving
electronic surveillance in the pursuit of criminal prosecution, the Supreme
Court did not decide whether the executive may conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance for the purpose of national security.16
The Supreme Court addressed the executive’s constitutional authority
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of domestic threats to

10

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11
Id. at 466.
12
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13
Id. at 351.
14
Id. at 359.
15
Id. at 360-61; See also Scott J. Glick, FISA’s Significant Purpose Requirement and
the Government’s Ability to Protect National Security, 1 HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY L.
REV., 87, 94 (May 30, 2010).
16
Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 (“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case.”)
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national security in United States vs. United States District Court (Keith).17
In Keith, the defendant planted an overnight bomb meant to destroy the
property of a local C.I.A. office in protest to the C.I.A. presence in Ann
Arbor, Michigan.18 The defendant attempted to compel the government to
produce evidence pertaining to information gathered by electronic
surveillance.19 The government refused to disclose the surveillance
evidence, claiming the surveillance was a reasonable exercise of the
president’s inherent authority to protect national security, and that
disclosure would threaten national security.20 The Court, while
recognizing the president’s duty to protect the nation from threats to
national security, nonetheless held that the Fourth Amendment requires
the president to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance
for domestic security purposes.21
While the Court in Keith limited it’s ruling to domestic surveillance,
expressly reserving the question of the president’s authority in cases of
foreign powers or their agents,22 the decision was highly suggestive as to
Congress’s powers to proscribe procedures for national security
surveillance that comply with the Fourth Amendment.23 Significantly, the
Court acknowledged that in the case of intelligence gathering,
[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government
for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For
the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest
to be enforced and the nature of the citizen rights deserving protection.24
Keith was significant in both recognizing Congress’s authority to
enact specific procedures for intelligence gathering, and also noting that
the procedures proscribed may very well differ from the standards set by
the Fourth Amendment when the pursuit is intelligence gathering.25 Keith
17
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-22 (1972). The case is
known as the Keith case because it arose out of a writ of mandamus against the Honorable
Judge Damon Keith, United States District Court Judge, who ordered the government to
disclose wiretapping information.
18
Id. at 299.
19
Id. at 299-300.
20
Id. at 301.
21
Id. at 320-22. (“We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the
President’s domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner
compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”)
22
Id. at 321-22.
23
Id. at 322.
24
Id. at 322-23.
25
See Nicholos J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Protecting Civil
Liberties That Make Defense of Our Nation Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, 366
(2006).
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created a circuit split among courts that accepted an implicit exception to
the warrant requirement where the national security threat was a foreign
power, and others that would not recognize an exception for foreign
security threats.26 Subsequent historical events involving the executive
branch’s abuse of power in the name of national security compelled
Congress to heed the Supreme Court’s advice in Keith and legislate in the
field of intelligence gathering.27

b.

FISA: The Legislative Response to Executive Abuse

It is 1973 in Washington D.C., the political parties have set aside their
differences and all three branches of government have banded together as
a result of one of the most salient and atrocious abuses of power America
has suffered in recent history: Watergate.28 American Presidents have
historically claimed the ability to conduct warrantless national security
surveillance as ancillary to their duty to protect from national security
threats.29 The other branches held the belief that the executive branch was
overreaching its constitutionally granted powers, and infringing on civil
liberties in the process.30
This tension came to a head when President Nixon’s scandalous use
of electronic surveillance to spy on his political party opponents became
public.31 The legislature soon realized that Nixon used the guise of national
security to justify illegally spying on those lawfully engaged in political
dissent.32 In response to President Nixon’s abuse of warrantless electronic
surveillance, an investigation was launched, known as the “Church
Committee” to discover what other abuses had occurred as a result of
unchecked executive power under the guise of national security.33
The Church Committee uncovered a startling history of government
exploiting electronic surveillance since the 1930s, the targets of which
ranged from Congressmen, White House advisors, anti-war protest
groups, and others who posed no actual threat to national security.34 The
26

See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1385 (June 1993).
27
Id. at 1385-88.
28
Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/
watergate/articles/101072-1.htm.
29
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1382.
30
Id.
31
Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong With The FISA Court, 14,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, (2015).
32
Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386.
33
See Whilt, supra note 25, at 385.
34
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7, (noting that while a number of illegal or
improper national security taps and bugs conducted during the Nixon administration may
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two-year long investigation by the Church Committee revealed that
President Eisenhower authorized the FBI to conduct domestic electronic
surveillance on political opponents, including Martin Luther King Jr.’s
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.35 The Church Committee
found that every executive since Franklin. D. Roosevelt had claimed the
power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance and abused that
power.36 Congress became especially concerned with the potential stifling
of constitutionally protected speech in the form of political dissent.37 The
unsettling discovery of executive abuse motivated the executive branch
and Congress to create legislation that would safeguard against
overreaching executive power in the form of warrantless electronic
surveillance.38 In 1978, as a reaction to the Church Committee’s
discoveries, Congress enacted FISA.39

have exceeded those in previous administrations, the surveillance was regrettably by no
means atypical).
35
Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 13.
36
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAS, 95TH CONG.,
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (Comm. Print 1978). [hereinafter
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT].
37
Id. at 3909-10. (“Also formidable-although incalculable-is the ‘chilling effect’ which
warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights of those who were
not targets of the surveillance, but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or
unreasonably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only with direct
infringements on constitutional rights, but also with government activities which
effectively inhibit the exercise of these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends
in large measure on citizens’ understanding that they will be able to be publicly active and
dissent from official policy, within lawful limits, without having to sacrifice the
expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold. Arbitrary or uncontrolled use of
warrantless electronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair that public
confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life.”)
38
Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 14.
39
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386. See also SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note
36, at 3908 (“the need for such statutory safeguards has become apparent in recent years.
This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic
surveillance in the nation of national security has been seriously abused.”).
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FISA in Operation: Legislative Structure and Protections
i. Procedural Safeguards

FISA establishes a statuary procedure that allows the government to
conduct electronic surveillance40 by first obtaining judicial approval.41
FISA mandates that before a government agency conducts electronic
surveillance, the government agency must obtain a particular warrant
(“FISA warrant”) by a special tribunal body, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”).42 First, the government files a detailed
application to FISC requesting authorization for electronic surveillance of
a facility or place.43 The application must contain a sworn statement by a
federal officer and be approved by the attorney general.44 The application
must also include “the identity or description of the target of surveillance,45
a statement of facts that justify the belief that the target is an agent of a
foreign power,46 a statement of the proposed minimization procedures,47 a
description of the “nature of the information sought and the type of
communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance,”48 and a
certification that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information that cannot “reasonably be obtained by normal
investigative techniques,”49 among other things.
The FISC must then find that the application does indeed contain the
above requirements,50 and enter an order describing the identity of the
40

See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). FISA defines electronic surveillance under four categories;
(1) acquisition of wire or radio communications that intentionally targets a particular
known United States person who is in the United States; (2) acquisition of wire
communication to or from a person in the united states, without consent of any party, if the
acquisition occurs in the united states; (3) the intentional acquisition of radio
communication if both the sender and recipients are in the United States; and (4) the
installation of electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States
other than from a wire or radio.
41
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1389.
42
See Glick, supra note 15, at 93.
43
See Director of National Intelligence, The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A 1 (Apr. 18,
2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for%
20Publication.pdf.
44
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (“Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance
under this chapter shall be made by a Federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to
a [FISA court] judge. Each application shall require the approval of the Attorney General
based upon his finding that it satisfies the criteria and requirements of such application as
set forth in this chapter.”)
45
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2).
46
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3).
47
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4).
48
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5).
49
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6).
50
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
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target, the nature and location of the sites where the surveillance is to be
conducted, the type of information sought, the means to be employed, and
the period of time for which the surveillance is approved.51 Importantly,
for the application to be approved, the government must show probable
cause to believe the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power,
and that the facility or place to be surveilled is used or about to be used
by the target.52 By requiring the government to elaborate their suspicions
with specific details, FISA places strict limits on the executive’s ability to
conduct electronic surveillance in an effort to suppress lawful political
dissent.53
Congress also built in a course of redress whenever electronic
surveillance for the purpose of intelligence gathering is conducted without
a FISA warrant.54 FISA provides that a person who “engages in electronic
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by [FISA, the Wiretap
Act, the Stored Communications Act, or the pen register statute] or any
express statutory authorization” is guilty of a criminal offense.55 FISA also
provides for a private right of action for an aggrieved person56 who has
been subjected to surveillance against the person who committed the
surveillance.57 Finally, and most significantly for this note, FISA allows
for in camera and ex parte review by a district court of “the application,
order or other materials relation to the surveillance as may be necessary to
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully
authorized and conducted” under statutorily defined circumstances.58

ii. Constitutional Protections
The purpose of FISA was to strike a balance in which the executive
branch could conduct legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance without
abridging the right to individual privacy and civil liberties guaranteed by
the constitution.59 FISA warrants, while providing significantly

51

50 U.S.C. § 1804(c)(1)
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(4).
53
Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 14.
54
See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
55
50 U.S.C. § 1809(a).
56
50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (defining “Aggrieved person” as “a person who is the target of
an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were
subject to electronic surveillance.”).
57
50 U.S.C. § 1810 (providing “an aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an
electronic surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance of
such person has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 of this title shall have
a cause of action against any person who committed such violation.”)
58
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
59
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386-87.
52
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diminished protections than traditional law enforcement warrants,60 are
imperative to retaining any meaningful First and Fourth Amendment
rights. This is because in times of national security crises, the government
looks most suspiciously to those who exercise their First Amendment
rights to political speech and exercise of religion.61 The Supreme Court
noted in Keith that national security cases reveal an extraordinary merging
of First and Fourth Amendment rights because although “the investigative
duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.”62
Indeed, there is a history of the federal government sacrificing
individual liberties in the name of national security whenever they
perceive a “threat” among a particular group.63 In the post-9/11 era, the
focus has shifted to Muslim Americans exercising their constitutionally
protected freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.64 For
example, the FBI has expended considerable energy on creating
demographic profiles to map the racial, ethnic and religious make up of
communities in order to pin point their investigative sights.65 After
targeting these groups solely based on unconstitutional religious
profiling,66 the FBI infiltrates Muslim communities by sending undercover
informants, often posed as newcomers seeking guidance, to covertly
gather as much information as possible by attending mosques and
community events.67
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s
protections of private communications are necessary to exercising First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association.68 In enacting FISA,
Congress intended to prevent the government from unjustifiably intruding
upon the privacy of individuals by providing a means for the government
to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before conducting

60

For a comparison of protections and procedures offered by Title III warrants and FISA
warrants, see Whilt, supra note 25.
61
See Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The
Guilty By Association Critique, 101 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1408, 1418 (2003).
62
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972).
63
See Chesney, supra note 61, at 1412 (describing the historical cycle of civil liberties
abuse during past times of national security crises).
64
See Illusions of Justice, supra note 7, at 18.
65
Id.
66
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU EYE on the FBI: The FBI is Engaged in
Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial Mapping (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert__fbi_engaged_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial_mapping_0.pdf.
67
See Illusions of Justice, supra note 7, at 18-19.
68
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972).
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surveillance for intelligence gathering purposes.69 Thus, by allowing the
government to invade the privacy of those the federal government deems
to be a “threat,” without a FISA warrant supported by probable cause, we
risk chilling the freedom of speech that distinguishes American society
from an Orwellian state.70

III.

STATE SECRETS

“We’d do well to remember that at the end of the day, the law
doesn’t defend us; we defend the law. And when it becomes
contrary to our morals, we have both the right and the
responsibility to rebalance it toward just ends.” – Edward
Snowden
Where plaintiffs attempt to bring a civil suit on the grounds that they
believe they have been warrantlessly surveilled, the government often
attempts to bar the suit on the grounds of state secrets privilege.71 The state
secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the
government to prevent discovery of information containing state or
military secrets on the basis disclosing such information poses a threat to
national security. 72 The privilege can only be invoked by the head of an
executive branch agency with the authority to sign a sworn affidavit
confirming that he or she has personally reviewed the relevant information
and determined it contains state secrets.73 The state secrets privilege has a
long history of invocation,74 but the government’s assertion of the
privilege in the post 9/11 era in response to claims of Fourth and First

69

See SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 36, at 3908.
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1394.
71
Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 47; see also Laura K. Donohue, Shadow of States
Secrets, 159 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2010).
72
Stephanie A. Fichera, Compromising Liberty for National Security: The Need to Rein
in the Executive’s Use of the State Secrets Privilege in Post–September 11 Litigation, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 628 (2008).
73
See Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
74
There is some ongoing debate on whether the frequency of the privilege has spiked in
the post 9/11 era. Compare Robert M. Chesney, States Secrets and the Limits of National
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1301 (2007) (contending that the state
secrets privilege has been invoked with uniform frequency among presidents) with Louis
Fisher, In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds
case 212, 245 (2006) (arguing that the state secrets privilege is unnecessary, contrary to
individual liberties and due process, and supportive of executive abuse of power, asserts
that the privilege is being asserted with greater frequency in the post 9/11 era).
70
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Amendment constitutional violations has led to increasingly unchecked
executive power and violations of civil liberties.75
The state secrets privilege has origins in the Supreme Court’s 1875
decision in Totten v. United States.76 In Totten, a Union spy claimed to be
in contract with President Lincoln, who told him to travel behind enemy
lines and relay information about the Confederate Army in return for $200
per month.77 The Court held that it did not have the authority to enforce
the contract because the lawsuit would “inevitably lead to the disclosure
of matters which the law itself regards as confidential.”78 The very subject
matter of the suit, the Court explained, would risk disclosure of “the details
of dealing with individuals and officers . . . to the serious detriment of the
public,” and therefore the Court dismissed the case.79
The modern-day state secrets privilege was first announced by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States.80 In Reynolds, the widows of
three men killed in an Air Force B-29 plane crash brought a suit against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.81 The plaintiffs
sought production of the Air Force’s official investigation report and
statements of surviving crew members made during the investigation.82
The Secretary of the Air Force refused to produce the documents, filing a
formal claim of state secrets privilege on the grounds that production of
the documents would “seriously hamper[ ] national security, flying safety,
and the development of highly technical and secret military equipment.”83
The Supreme Court accepted the Government’s claim and held that where
there is a formal claim of privilege invoked by the head of an executive
department and an indication of a “reasonable possibility that military
secrets were involved,” the state secrets privilege may bar disclosure of
evidentiary materials.84 The Court stated that it would be up to the
presiding court to determine whether to examine the evidence in question,
75

Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2007) (“For over two decades following Reynolds, the executive
rarely asserted the state secrets privilege . . . .But starting in 1977, the executive raised the
privilege with greater frequency”); See also H. R. NO. 110-442, at 8 (“[the current]
administration has raised the state secrets privilege in over 25 [percent] more cases per year
than previous administrations and sought dismissal in over 90 [percent] more cases.”)
(citing to 154 Cong. Rec. S198 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)).
76
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
77
Id. at 106.
78
Id. at 107.
79
Id. at 106-107.
80
Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
81
Id. at 2-3.
82
Id. at 3; Without the investigation report, the plaintiffs could not establish a prima
facie case of negligence, thereby warranting dismissal. See Donohue, supra note 71, at 82.
83
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5.
84
Id. at 4-5, 10-11.
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but forewarned that where there is a danger that evidence will expose
matters of national security that should not be disclosed, the court should
not “jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by
insisting upon an examination,” even in camera.85
The executive branch may cite the above two seminal cases in support
of a claim of state secrets privilege.86 The Totten Bar applies where the
subject matter of the action itself is a state secret.87 The Totten Bar acts as
a complete bar on adjudication of claims centered on state secrets.88 In
contrast, the Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary tool that acts to remove
the privileged evidence from litigation, and only where the state secrets
are so interwoven with the case that it cannot be litigated without risk of
disclosure is dismissal the proper remedy.89 Courts have found dismissal
under Reynolds appropriate in only three circumstances: (1) where the
plaintiff cannot prove their prima facie elements of the claim without the
privileged evidence; (2) where the privilege deprives the defendant of
information needed to put forth a valid defense; and (3) where the
privileged evidence is so inextricable with nonprivileged information that
is essential to the claims or defenses and litigating a case on its merits
would impermissibly risk disclosing state secrets.90 Despite the clear
difference in how the Totten bar and Reynolds privilege operate to dismiss
a case implicating state secrets, the government has practiced moving for
outright dismissal of complaints rather than just preclusion of discovery
materials since the 1970s.91

IV.

FAZAGA V. FBI

In July 2006, Craig Monteilh began his work as a paid FBI informant
targeting the Muslim community in an effort to covertly gather
information about Muslims in the Irvine, California area.92 In an effort to
earn the trust of the Muslim community, Monteilh began attending the
Islamic Center of Irvine (“ICOI”).93 Following instructions from his FBI

85

Id. at 10.
Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1226-28 (9th Cir. 2019)
(noting the two instances in which state secrets may apply).
87
Id. at 1227.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. (citing Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc)).
91
Id. at 1227.
92
First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18.
93
Id.
86
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supervisors, he approached an imam,94 told a fabricated story of his French
and Syrian decent and his desire to fully embrace his roots by formally
converting to Islam, and from that point forward became entirely
immersed in his role as a Muslim convert.95 Monteilh was provided with
surveillance tools, including audio and video recording devices, and was
instructed to perform specific spying tasks.96 These tasks included
attending certain meetings and entering the houses of specific people, in
order to “gather information on Muslims.”97 The FBI agents supervising
Monteilh made it clear that the FBI had no single target, but instead were
interested in the Muslim community as a whole, stating they wanted to
“get as many files on this community as possible.”98
Over the course of about fourteen months, Monteilh did as instructed
by his FBI supervisors to gain the trust of the Muslim community in
Orange County.99 Monteilh attended classes at the mosque, collected
information on Muslim community members’ travel plans, attended daily
prayers, exercised with targeted people to build a relationship, visited
targeted houses and made lunch plans with specified Muslim
individuals.100 Virtually all of Montiehl’s interactions with the Muslim
community were recorded with audio and video recording devices,
including a cell phone, two key fobs with audio recording capabilities, and
a camera disguised as a button on his shirt.101 Monteilh’s recordings
included audio from at least eight mosques, video of the layout of various
mosques and homes, and most egregiously, conversations and meetings in
the mosque prayer hall to which he was not a party to.102 An electronic
device was installed in Fazaga’s office and other parts of his mosque not
open to the public in order to record these conversations.103
Ironically, Operation Flex began to unravel when Monteilh was
instructed by his FBI supervisors to press Muslims in the community about
jihad and armed conflict. He was told to indicate his readiness to engage
in violence, and state he believed it was his “duty as a Muslim to take
violent actions” and that he had access to weapons.104 Several ICOI
members took these statements and reported them and Monteilh to
94

An Imam is the prayer leader of a mosque. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imam.
95
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1212-13.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1212.
99
Id. at 1213.
100
Id. at 1212-13.
101
Id. at 1213.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1213-14.
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community leaders, who then reported Monteilh to the FBI.105 The IOCI
obtained a restraining order against Monteilh in June 2007, around the
same time the FBI discharged him from Operation Flex.106 The dragnet
surveillance did not result in a single counterterrorism conviction—a
predictable result considering the FBI targeted the Muslim community
based solely on their religious practice and not on the basis of any
suspected criminal activity.107
In September 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit as a putative class action on
behalf of “[a]ll individuals targeted by Defendant for surveillance or
information-gathering through Monteilh and Operation Flex, on the
account of their religion, and about whom the FBI gained personally
identifiable information.”108 The complaint alleged eleven causes of
action, which can be categorized as claims alleging unconstitutional
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment and claims alleging illegal
discrimination on the basis of, or burdens on, or abridgement of religion
in violation of the First Amendment.109 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief,
specifically an order for Defendants to destroy or return any information
gathered by or derived from the unlawful surveillance program, as well as
damages, for themselves and the class.110 The government moved to
dismiss and for summary judgment on the grounds that the religion
claims—but not the search claims—should be dismissed under the
Reynolds state secrets privilege because litigation on those claims could
not go forth without the threat of disclosure of evidence protected by state
secrets.111
The district court’s first order dismissed the FISA claim against the
government, but not the agent Defendants, on the basis that Congress had
not waived sovereign immunity under FISA.112 In a second order, the
district court dismissed all claims asserted by Plaintiffs on the basis of
Reynolds state secrets privilege, including the Fourth Amendment search
claims, which the Government did not seek dismissal of on state secrets
grounds.113 The district court held that the subject matter of the action,
Operation Flex, “involved intelligence that, if disclosed, would
105

Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id.
107
First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.
108
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1214.
109
Id. at 1214, 1235.
110
Id. at 1214.
111
Id. at 1214-15. The other defendants, who are all Agents of the FBI being sued in their
official capacity, moved to dismiss claims against them on multiple grounds, including
qualified immunity. Because those defenses present issues separate from the central issue
in this note, they will not be discussed.
112
Id. at 1215.
113
Id.
106
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significantly compromise national security.”114 The district court found
that the Government Defendants would need to rely on privileged
evidence “so inextricably tied up with nonprivileged material” that the risk
of disclosure could not be averted through protective procedures.115 The
district court also declined to use the in camera, ex parte procedures
provided under §1806(f) of FISA, concluding that FISA’s procedures do
not apply to non-FISA claims.116
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims on state secrets grounds.117 The court, relying on Fourth
Amendment caselaw and paying careful attention to First Amendment
implications, found that the plaintiffs pleaded plausible FISA claims.118
The court held the procedures established by Congress in FISA replaced
the dismissal remedy to common law state secrets privilege as applied to
electronic surveillance.119 The court noted that the district court erred in
dismissing some of the claims outright on state secrets grounds where the
government did not assert the privilege, and on the claims in which the
government did assert the privilege, the district court should have
reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of
whether the surveillance was illegal pursuant to FISA procedures.120 In a
ruling of first impression, the court reaffirmed the legislative intent behind
FISA, emphasizing Congress’s aim at reigning in executive abuse of
electronic surveillance.121 The court held that FISA’s §1806(f) procedures
applied to affirmative constitutional challenges to unlawful surveillance or
its use in litigation, regardless of whether the challenge is brought under
FISA, the Constitution, or any other law.122

V.

ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit in Fazaga v. FBI revived the purpose of FISA, and
in doing so, upheld the basic constitutional principles of separation of
powers. First, the court correctly analyzed the FISA claims under a
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1254.
118
Id. at 1253-54. The court found some of the FISA claims were not plausible because
the Plaintiffs lacked an expectation of privacy under Fourth Amendment caselaw, and some
of the claims were plausible but the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because the
law was unclear. Because this note focuses on the FISA claims that were allowed to
proceed, these holdings will not be discussed in depth.
119
Id. at 1233-34.
120
Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
121
Id. at 1225, 1233.
122
Id. at 1238.
115

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

93

traditional—yet scrupulous—Fourth Amendment analysis, using Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test and acknowledging the implications
of First Amendment rights in national security cases like this one. Second,
the court properly held that the procedures established by Congress in
FISA were intended to displace the state secrets privilege in so far as it
called for outright dismissal of claims.

a.
The Court Justifiably Applied Careful Fourth Amendment
Analysis
“The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of individuals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.” –
McDonald v. US (1948)
The Fazaga court was correct in scrupulously analyzing the Plaintiffs’
expectations of privacy in this context because much of the privacy
violations took place in a religious setting and thus implicated both First
and Fourth Amendment rights.123 After determining the complaint
sufficiently pleaded that Plaintiffs were “aggrieved persons” as defined by
FISA, the court then turned to whether the surveillance in Operation Flex
constituted “electronic surveillance” within the meaning of FISA.124 The
court explained that in order for the defendant’s electronic surveillance to
constitute a violation under FISA, the court must find that (1) plaintiffs
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes.125

123

See infra Part IV.a.
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1216, 1239. FISA provides four categories of electronic
surveillance. See supra note 40, and accompanying text. In this case, only the fourth
category was at issue: “the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than
from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4).
125
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1217 (noting that the complaint alleges no warrant was obtained,
thus court’s analysis focused on whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
124
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i. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis Under
FISA is the Same as Under the Fourth Amendment
FISA provides for criminal sanctions and civil liability where law
enforcement undertakes electronic surveillance without a FISA warrant in
situations where there exists a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”126 The
court properly analyzed the statutory “reasonable expectation of privacy”
standard analogously to the analysis under traditional law enforcement
purposes because the origins of FISA can be traced back to executive
branch’s unconstitutional electronic surveillance for law enforcement
purposes.127 The decision in Katz rejected the proposition that the
executive branch has unlimited power to conduct electronic surveillance
for law enforcement purposes without prior judicial approval.128 The Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy standard has since been named the
“touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.”129 The legislature followed
the Court’s cue in Katz by creating the Wiretap Act, which allows law
enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance only with prior judicial
approval in the form of Title III warrants.130
Likewise, the enactment of FISA was a reaction by Congress to
executive abuse of power in the form of electronic surveillance in the name
of “national security” in much the same respect as the Wiretap Act was a
reaction the same form of executive abuse in the name of law
enforcement.131 Insofar as FISA originates from a desire to protect the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusions, the court in Fazaga correctly evaluated the
statutory standard of “reasonable expectation of privacy” in FISA just as
the expectation of privacy standard would be under the Fourth
Amendment for law enforcement purposes.

ii. Plaintiffs Expectations of Privacy are Greater in Religious
Spaces
In determining whether or not Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the court exhibited a heightened level of skepticism towards
the executive branch where Plaintiffs’ freedom of religion was also
126

50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f), 1809-10.
See supra Part III and accompanying text discussing the origins of FISA as dating
back to Olmstead and Katz.
128
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
129
California v. Ciraolo, 47 U.S. 207, 211-212 (1986).
130
See Whilt, supra note 25, at 371 (“Congress enacted Title III, a statute governing
electronic surveillance modeled after constitutional guidelines specified by the Supreme
Court in Katz”).
131
See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386-87.
127
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implicated.132 The court did so by separating the instances of surveillance
where there was a religious characteristic of the surveilled activity.133 First,
in accordance with traditional Fourth Amendment caselaw,134 the court
held that Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for
recordings of conversations in which Monteilh was a party, therefore no
violation of FISA occurred.135 This is because where an undercover agent
is an “invited informer,” Plaintiffs do not have a privacy interest in what
is voluntary revealed to that agent.136 Nonetheless, the court found that
under well-established Fourth Amendment caselaw, there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy from covert recordings of conversations taking
place in one’s home, car, office, or phone.137 Because there was evidence
FBI agents bugged Plaintiff Fazaga’s office and Plaintiff AbdelRahim’s
house,138 and no warrant was obtained, these recordings plausibly alleged
a violation of FISA.139
The court justifiably applied more careful Fourth Amendment analysis
where the recordings took place in sacred religious spaces, such as the
Mosque prayer halls. A reasonable expectation of privacy involves two
inquires: first, that the person had a subjective expectation, and second,
the expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept.140 When
First Amendment expressions of religion, especially in private places, are
involved, there exists an unquestionable expectation of the exact privacy
the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect.141 The expression of
private thoughts, prayers, and confessions, relies on the ability to trust one
is not being overheard.142
132

Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1244 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1218, 1222.
134
Fazaga, 916. F.3d at 1219 (citing United States v. Walchumwah, 710 F.3d 862, 867
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing the invited informer doctrine for the proposition that voluntary
conversations with undercover informants are not protected by the Fourth Amendment
because voluntary disclosures lack reasonable expectations of privacy); see generally Mike
Bothwell, Facing God or the Government—United States v. Aguilar: A Big Step for Big
Brother, 1990. BYU L. REV. 1003 (1990) (discussing the invited former doctrine and its
impingement on First and Fourth Amendment constitutional rights).
135
Fazaga, 916. F.3d at 1220.
136
Id. at 1219.
137
Id. at 1224.
138
Id. at 1225 (including a statement by FBI agents questioning Monteilh for not
disclosing a conversation that occurred in AbdelRahim’s house and that they knew of the
conversation because of the recordings).
139
Id.
140
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
141
See supra note 36; See also United States vs. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S.
297, 313-14 (1972).
142
See Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of
Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 541, 597 (2008).
133
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In Katz, the Supreme Court emphasized the subjective intent to be free
of eavesdropping intruders, exhibited by shutting the door to a telephone
booth.143 Here, the court in Fazaga found that “based on the rules and
customs of the mosque, and the allegations in the complaint,” it had “no
trouble determining that Plaintiffs manifested an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in their conversations there.”144 The court
emphasized that the mosque was not an ordinary space—it is a place of
worship, prayer, and fellowship.145 Moreover, the ICOI—where many
Plaintiffs attended—specifically forbade audio or video recording in the
mosque without permission.146 Thus, the court correctly held that Plaintiffs
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in their activities within the
mosque prayer hall.
The court properly rejected the government’s argument that because
Plaintiffs were not alone, their expectation of privacy was diminished.147
As the court explained, a person is entitled to have an expectation of
privacy in shared spaces, especially where there is a particular reason to
expect confidentially.148 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
whether a space is shared does not diminish the expectation that a person
will not be recorded in that space.149 Mosques specifically are a place
where trust and confidence is essential, because much of the discussion
revolves around theology and the practice of Islam.150 The court was
therefore correct to find that Plaintiffs had a subjective intent to express
their religious beliefs and exchange ideas and emotions in a safe space,
free from government observation.
After finding that Plaintiffs exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy, the court correctly determined that Plaintiffs had an expectation
of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.151 The
court highlighted that context is key to this inquiry, and thus emphasis
should be placed on the nature of the place where the recordings were
made.152 Here, the mosque prayer hall is a sacred and intimate place that

143
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (“[A] person in a telephone booth may
rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it . . . is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.”).
144
Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1220 (9th Cir. 2019).
145
Id. at 1220.
146
Id. at 1221.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1221-22 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)).
150
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1221.
151
Id. at 1223.
152
Id. at 1222.
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is distinguishable from typical public spaces.153 The court accurately
emphasized the location of the Mosque prayer hall, because the Fourth
Amendment requires that sight is not lost of the place in which a person
expects privacy.154 For example, the Framers designed the warrant clause
of the Fourth Amendment to require particularity with respect to the place
to be searched in order to protect private spaces and permit searches only
where evidence of a crime may be found.155 The Constitution’s intentional
limitations on law enforcement’s ability to search particular spaces
without a warrant confirms that some spaces are objectively more private
than others.156 The court skillfully contrasted the sacred nature of the
mosque prayer hall with public spaces where society accepts a diminished
sense of privacy, finding that the judiciary’s “constitutional protection of
religious observance” supports finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the mosque prayer hall where privacy concerns are recognized and
protected.157
Finally, the court underscored the First Amendment implications of
the mosque prayer hall on Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy.158
Relying on Supreme Court caselaw, the court explained that when the
surveillance is aimed at content protected by the First Amendment, “the
Fourth Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’”159 True
enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms cannot take place without Fourth
Amendment protections—the growth of self, the finding of theological
values, and even reflections of political dissent rely on the ability to trust
one will be left alone.160 Particularly for Muslims, prayer is a pillar of
religion: it is a necessary and profound ritual that requires individual
devotion and expungement of the outside world.161 This sacred religious

153

Id.
See Avery, supra note 141, at 596-97.
155
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”)
156
Another example is the home. Although there are many exceptions to the warrant
requirement in public spaces, such as exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly found that searches and seizures inside of a home are assumed to be
unreasonable. See. e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006).
157
Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019).
158
Id.
159
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
See Avery, supra note 141, at 588; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution, in writing
the Fourth Amendment, “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone–
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
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See
The
Five
Pillars
of
Islam,
METRO. MUSEUM OF ART,
https://www.metmuseum.org/learn/educators/curriculum-resources/art-of-the-islamic154
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practice, therefore, cannot exist without the ability to be free of unwanted
observations.162 The court recognized the prayers and religious activities
that Operation Flex targeted were of the kind of activities that the Fourth
Amendment was drafted, in part, to protect and must be considered
reasonable.163
The Supreme Court has long recognized that national security cases
comprise an extraordinary merging of First and Fourth amendment
values.164 Given that the Supreme Court has already rejected the
executive’s use of warrantless surveillance in domestic security cases,
finding that “unreviewed executive discretion” may too readily “overlook
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech,”165 it was only
suitable for the court in Fazaga to recognize these same Fourth and First
Amendment concerns also exist in foreign security cases. This is
especially true following the 9/11 attacks, in which time there has been a
rise in abridgments of First Amendment rights of Muslims in America.166
Here, where Plaintiffs were targeted on the sole basis of their religious
associations, the court was right to recognize that Fourth Amendment
protections become “more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy.”167 After all, FISA
itself serves as congressional recognition that Fourth Amendment rights
must not be abridged on the basis of First Amendment protected freedoms,
such as religious expression.168 Accordingly, the court was justified in
concluding that society recognizes an expectation of privacy, perhaps
worthy of even greater Fourth Amendment protections, where freedom of
religious expression is at stake.169

world/unit-one/the-five-pillars-of-islam;
see
also
Worship,
BBC,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z94dtfr/revision/1.
162
See Avery, supra note 141, at 597.
163
Id. at 596-97.
164
United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
165
Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
166
See generally Illusions of Justice, supra note 7.
167
United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. at 314.
168
See S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908 (“The exercise of political
freedom depends in large measure on citizen’ understanding that they will be able to be
publicly active and dissent from official policy . . . without having to sacrifice the
expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold.”).
169
Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1224 (9th Cir. 2019)
(concluding that although the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
conversations within the Mosque prayer halls, the law was unclear in the area and so the
FBI Agent Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for this category of recordings).
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b.
The Court Reinforced Separation of Powers Principles in
Holding FISA Procedures Overruled the State Secrets Dismissal
Remedy
In holding that Plaintiffs’ claims could proceed through the tailored
procedures Congress established in FISA, the court upheld basic principles
of constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances. The court
emphasized the legislative intent behind FISA: to provide a check on the
executive’s abusive use of electronic surveillance in the name of national
security.170 In doing so, the court accomplished three very important aims.
First, the court prevented the executive branch from transforming the
Reynolds evidentiary privilege into a broad claim of executive immunity.
Second, the court confirmed Congress’s intent to delegate to the judiciary
branch a role in checking on the executive branch’s encroachment on civil
liberties under the guise of national security. Finally, the court fulfilled its
constitutional duty to oversee executive action where an individual alleges
abuse of authority, unconstitutional conduct, or violation of a statute.

i. The Court Correctly Affirmed that Reynolds is a Rule of
Evidence, Not a Constitutional Construction for Unitary
Executive Power
As the court explained, the Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary rule
evolved through common-law, it is not a constitutional instrument for the
executive to claim unchecked, arbitrary power.171 The state secrets
privilege, if left unbound, has the ability to shield the executive from
accountability, public scrutiny, and potential civil liability by removing
judicial review and preventing abuses of power from coming to light
through litigation.172 Moreover, the privilege has the power to turn a
limited evidentiary rule into a constitutional claim of unitary executive
power over any and all claims pertaining to national security.173 Where the
privilege is used to outright dismiss cases—especially at the pleading stage
before discovery—the executive immediately insulates himself from
judicial and public scrutiny, over time transforming the privilege into a
tool for concentrating power in one branch.174
Ironically, the devastating consequences of the state secrets privilege
on constitutional guarantees are exactly why it was necessary for the court
to pronounce that the state secrets privilege is not a rule of constitutional
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1231.
See Fichera, supra note 72, at 627.
See Frost, supra note 75, at 1932; see also Fichera, supra note 72, at 640.
See Chesney, supra note 74, at 1269.
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construction—it is a rule of evidence.175 By reciting the common-law
origins of the privilege and the limited situations in which the Reynolds
privilege may serve to dismiss a case, the court rejected the executive’s
claim that the privilege may act as unbound deference through which
executive defendants may insulate themselves.176 Indeed the Reynolds
court itself recognized the court’s gatekeeping function for the state’s
privileged evidence, instructing the court to determine itself whether the
claim of privilege was appropriate under the circumstances, while being
careful not to disclose national security secrets. As the Fazaga court noted,
however, a mere cry of military secrets, counterterrorism, or national
security by the executive is not sufficient to support a finding that the
evidence is privileged. Instead, courts should continue to act as the
gatekeepers of evidence, even where state secrets are at stake, to avoid
being over deferential to the executive and disrupting separation of powers
principles.177 Finally, by confining the state secrets privilege, and the
Reynolds rule in particular, to a common law rule of evidence rather than
constitutional construction, the court gave constitutional support to
Congress’s ability to overrule state secrets through the legislation of
FISA.178
After the court reiterated the common-law nature of the state secrets
privilege and confirmed Congress’s ability to legislate over the
privilege,179 the court’s holding confirmed Congress’s intent to make
§1806(f) of FISA the exclusive means for evaluating evidence that
potentially threatens national security in determining the legality of
electronic surveillance.180 The court explained that the procedures in
§1806(f) arise from the same concern as the state secrets privilege—
disclosure of evidence that threatens national security—and that §1806(f)
175

Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1231 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1227.
177
See Fisher, supra note 74, at 258 (“Broad deference by the courts to the executive
branch, allowing an official to determine what documents are privileged, undermines the
judiciary’s duty to assure fairness in the courtroom and to decide what evidence may be
introduced.”). For a further discussion of the Judiciary Branch’s constitutional duties, see
infra part V.B.iii.
178
Fazaga, 916 F.3d. at 1231-32.
179
The court briefly noted that a clear statement by Congress that it was overruling a
common law rule is not required, only that the legislation “speaks directly to the question”
otherwise answered by federal common law is required. Here, the court found the
procedures in 1806(f) of FISA spoke directly to the dismissal remedy otherwise available
under common law state secrets privilege. Id. at 1231.
180
§ 1806(f) provides that where a motion is made to suppress evidence relating to
electronic surveillance on the grounds that disclosure would harm national security, the
district court hearing the motion should review in camera and ex parte the evidence to
determine whether the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1806(f); see also Fazaga, 926 F.3d at 1231.
176
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is triggered in a nearly identical process to the formal assertion triggering
state secrets privilege.181 As such, the court concluded that §1806(f)
codified the state secrets privilege with respect to consideration of
electronic state secrets evidence, directing in camera and ex parte review
of the relevant evidence in place of the common law dismissal remedy.182
By ruling FISA procedures to eliminate the need for Reynolds dismissal
remedy, the court reduces the executive’s ability to insulate himself from
scrutiny by claiming broad governmental immunity.

ii. The Court Accepted Congress’s Invitation to Provide a
Constitutionally Granted Joint Check on the President
The court found that the legislative intent behind FISA supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to give the courts a role in regulating
foreign intelligence surveillance.183 FISA was a response to the
executive’s abusive surveillance practices in the name of national security,
which lead to violations of constitutional rights of citizens “primarily
because checks and balances designed by the Framers of the Constitution
to assure accountability [were not] applied.”184 The court aptly highlighted
that FISA strikes a balance by enlisting both Congress and the courts in
the oversight of surveillance activities by the executive branch while
providing measures to safeguard national security.185 The court noted that
Congress considered the limitations placed on the courts under the
common law states secrets privilege, and intentionally recruited the courts
in protecting against electronic surveillance by enacting FISA.186
The court’s endorsement of FISA’s careful system of checks on broad
executive claims of state secrets reaffirmed the Framers’ will that each
branch of government shall play a role in checking on the others, so that

181

Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1232.
Id. at 1231-32.
183
Id. at 1232.
184
Id. at 1233 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 289 (1976).
185
Id. at 1232 (citing In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564. F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119
(N.D. Cal. 2013)); see also Ira S. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Act: Legislative
Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119,
204 (“In place of the lawlessness of the past, [FISA] offers a system of internal executive
accountability, a meaningful, antecedent role for the courts, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment . . . “).
186
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1233-34. See Frost, supra note 75, at 1957 (“Congress’s
deliberate use of the courts as a check on abuse of executive power should be a factor in
the court’s analysis of the state secrets privilege. Courts should always be cautious when
faced with executive assertion of the privilege, but they should be especially reluctant to
dismiss entire categories of challenges to executive actions that Congress intended them to
hear.”).
182
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no one branch usurps power from the other branches.187 The Framers
feared the abuse of executive power most, which is why the separation of
powers acts as a failsafe by allowing Congress to enjoin the court in
checking on the executive’s actions.188 Congress is empowered to delegate
when the courts should provide a check on the executive by granting them
jurisdiction to hear a variety of cases.189 When courts acquiesce to the
executive’s attempt to dismiss cases on the grounds that evidence is
protected by state secrets privilege, the court undermines Congress’s
attempt to cooperate with the courts, leaves the executive unchecked by
any branch, and jeopardizes civil liberties.190
The Ninth Circuit in Fazaga simply applied these principles to find
that Congress intended FISA to delegate to the courts authority to check
the executive where claims of unconstitutional surveillance arise.191 In
doing so, the court accepted the legislature’s offer to join forces in keeping
the executive’s surveillance practices in line with the constitution. The
court’s claim of authority is significant because the alliance between the
legislative and judicial branch becomes all the more important where, as
here, the civil liberties at stake are plenty and depend on the constitutional
guarantee of checks and balances.192

iii. The Court Fulfilled the Constitutional Duties of the
Judiciary Branch
The court in Fazaga executed its constitutional duty to oversee claims
of illegal executive action and provide redress where constitutional rights
are violated.193 The executive often uses the claim of privilege to strip
187

See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and
the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2006) (stating checking executive
power is “a central goal of the American constitution. [ . . . ] [t]he Framers of the
Constitution feared executive power the most [and therefore] viewed the principle of
separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just government.”).
188
Id.; see Frost, supra note 75, at 1933.
189
See Frost, supra note 75, at 1951, 1932 n.5 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants courts
jurisdiction to hear all civil actions “arising under” federal law).
190
See Frost, supra note 75, at 1933; see also Fisher, supra note 74, at 262 (“The Framers
adopted separation of powers and checks and balances because they did not trust human
nature and feared concentrated power. To defer to agency claims about privileged
documents and state secrets is to abandon the independence that the Constitution vests in
Congress and the courts, placing in jeopardy the individual liberties that depend on
institutional checks.”).
191
Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1231.
192
See Fichera, supra note 72, at 641.
193
“[I]t is the federal courts’ role to restrain and remedy unconstitutional government
conduct, and separation of powers is enhanced, not infringed, when the judiciary hears and
decides constitutional cases.” Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34-35 (4th ed.
2003).
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judicial power to oversee executive action.194 Were the courts to give the
executive broad, unquestioned deference in determining what evidence
contains state secrets and therefore must be privileged, there will be no
role left for the judiciary to oversee fairness in litigation and determine
what evidence may be introduced.195 As one constitutional scholar has put
it, if the judicial branch “rarely if ever actually reject[s] an assertion of the
privilege, a perception may arise within the executive branch . . . that
judicial review has no true bite . . . .”196 Fazaga therefore put the “bite”
back in judicial review by confirming the courts’ jurisdiction to hear cases
challenging the constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance.
Finally, by not being overly deferential to the executive branch’s claim of
state secrets, the court faithfully effected its constitutional duties to uphold
the laws of the land and provide redress where individual rights are
abridged.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Technology has given the individual great freedom to relax by solving
much of life’s inconveniences. At the same time, technology has put civil
liberties at great risk in a world where tiny recording devices can be found
and obtained with a quick search on Amazon.197 Today, in the wake of the
Edward Snowden leaks, the sale of consumer information by social
networks, and dragnet FBI surveillance, it is clear the consequences our
precious electronics may have on our right to privacy have only grown
since the enactment of FISA. If Americans are to retain any meaningful
right to privacy, and corollary right to freedom of expression within that
realm of privacy, checks and balances must remain in place to prevent
repetitive executive abuse of power. The Ninth Circuit’s use of FISA as a
tool of separation of powers reflects a courageous willingness of the
judicial branch to engage in checking executive function where core civil
liberties are at stake. While cries of national security threats are often used
to incite fear, America would do well to keep a watchful eye on the biggest
threat to our civilized democracy—an unbound executive chipping away
at civil liberty.
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